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Abstract: Assuming a stochastic external market demand, this research 
studies the benefit of the order coordination in a serially linked three-level 
supply chain. Each player’s cost is represented by the infinite horizon 
standard deviation of the end of period net stock levels. To represent the 
activity of a player in a supply chain, the generalized order-up-to policy 
proposed by Hosoda and Disney (2006a) is exploited. It is shown that to 
minimize the total supply chain cost, the attitude of the first level player to 
cost increases is essential. This type of order coordination is called 
“altruistic behavior” herein and can produce a large cost reduction (more 
than 20%) to the overall supply chain. A coordination model which may be 
more applicable in practical settings is also introduced with this benefit. 
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1 Introduction 
 
An order coordination policy based on the Order-Up-To (OUT) policy that 
minimizes the total inventory costs for a three-level supply chain will be 
examined. For a single level of a supply chain, Vassian (1955) introduced 
an ordering policy with a Work In Progress (WIP) feedback loop and 
showed that this ordering policy minimizes the variance of the end of 
period net stock levels. In addition, Vassian showed that the minimized 
variance of the end-period net inventory level is identical to the variance 
of the error in the forecast of demand over the lead-time plus review 
period. In this research, Vassian's ordering policy is called as the 
traditional OUT policy 1. From Vassian's seminal contribution, it is obvious 
that in a single level supply chain case, the traditional OUT policy is an 
optimal policy for minimizing the variance of the end of period net stock 
levels over time. In a multi-level supply chain scenario, however, it might 
be reasonable to assume that a sequence of traditional OUT policies may 
not be optimal anymore as there is no guarantee that a succession of 
local minimizations will result in a global optimum, as shown in Hosoda 
and Disney (2006a). Since the traditional OUT policy does not provide 
                                            
1 It should be noted that several researchers adopt an alternative expression for the OUT 
policy that exploits a time varying OUT target (see, Lee et al. 2000, for example), 
however, the dynamics given by these two expositions is identical, as shown in Hosoda 
and Disney (2006b). 
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much freedom to manipulate the dynamics of the ordering process, 
Hosoda and Disney (2006a) have investigated a two-level supply chain 
using the traditional OUT policy modified to include a proportional 
controller. This brings more flexibility to alter the dynamics of the ordering 
process, and shows that a sequence of traditional OUT policies is no 
longer optimal. They also show that to enjoy the cost saving, the attitude 
of the first level player to cost increases is an essential factor. They call 
this attitude “altruistic behavior”. In this chapter the model shown in 
Hosoda and Disney (2006a) will be extended to a three-level supply chain 
model, and the benefit of the altruistic behavior and roles of the first and 
the second level players in a three-level supply chain will be analyzed2. In 
addition, as a benchmark for performance comparisons, a sequence of 
three traditional OUT policies supply chain model shown in Hosoda and 
Disney (2006b) will be used.  
2 Literature review 
 
As a type of supply chain coordination, information sharing has been 
studied by many researchers. However, counter-intuitively, not all results 
support the benefit of information sharing.  
 
Graves (1999) studies a two-level supply chain with the OUT policy 
(termed “adaptive base-stock policy” in his paper), a non-stationary 
demand process, IMA(1,1) process, with Minimum Mean Square Error 
(MMSE) forecasting 3 . Graves finds that sharing demand information 
brings no benefit to the upstream player, if the upstream players know the 
coefficients of the customer demand process. Kim and Ryan (2003) 
analyse the value of demand information sharing using the model with an 
unknown demand process and an exponential smoothing forecast. They 
conclude that sharing demand data can significantly reduce the costs in 
upper-stream players of the supply chain. However, the benefit is limited 
when the upper-stream player has a large amount of historical order data, 
as by exploiting this data, the upper-stream player can improve its 
forecast accuracy. Assuming a known demand process and the MMSE 
forecast, Raghunathan (2001) reports similar results in that the set of 
order history data contains all the necessary information to allow the 
upper-stream player to reduce his costs. Assuming an AR(1) demand 
process, Lee et al. (2000) develop a two-level supply chain model and 
investigate the benefit of demand information sharing. Under their 
assumption that the manufacturer uses only the latest observed demand 
information in its forecast, they conclude that the manufacturer can obtain 
inventory and costs reductions with information sharing. Hosoda et al. 
                                            
2 Readers are encouraged to visit our web site 
http://www.bullwhip.co.uk/bwExplorer.htm 
to see how the altruistic behavior brings the benefits to a supply chain. 
3 For the details of an MMSE forecasting, see Box et al. (1994). 
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(2008) investigate the benefit of sharing the market demand information 
using a set of data obtained from a real retail supply chain. It is shown 
that there is a benefit of information sharing, and a source of such benefit 
is the error terms, which are originally hidden in the market demand 
process and difficult to extract without shared market demand information. 
In addition to information sharing, some researchers have analysed 
operational coordination of supply chains, such as Vendor Managed 
Inventory (VMI). This field of research has attracted abundant attention 
since the late 1990s. Disney and Towill (2003a) develop a two-level VMI 
supply chain model and compare the measured bullwhip with a traditional 
serially linked supply chain. They report that the VMI scheme can 
substantially reduce the bullwhip. In their VMI scheme, information about 
the first-level stock level, the goods in transit, the second-level stock level, 
and the reorder point is used to determine the target inventory level. 
Using their VMI model, Disney and Towill (2003b) investigate each of the 
potential sources of the bullwhip proposed by Lee et al. (1997). They 
show that two of the four causes; the rationing game and order batching, 
can be completely eliminated by the adoption of VMI scheme in a supply 
chain and other two causes also can be reduced significantly.  
 
Aviv and Federgruen (1998) study the benefits of a VMI scheme using a 
two-echelon supply chain model consisting of a single supplier and J 
retailers. They study three scenarios: 1) a traditional decentralised system, 
2) a VMI system, and 3) a system with full information sharing between 
players. Under the VMI program, the timing and magnitude of the 
replenishment shipments to the retailers are decided by the supplier on 
the basis of the full information given by all retailers. A comparison was 
made and they conclude that the VMI program (where information on 
inventory levels is also shared) has much more potential and can reduce 
costs by 4.7% on average. The benefits of VMI against the full information 
sharing scenario become larger when capacity is tight, since VMI scheme 
enables the supplier to increase its utilization rate. Using a serially linked 
two-level supply chain with an AR(1) market demand, Hosoda and Disney 
(2006a) investigate the impact of altruistic behavior on the overall supply 
chain cost. To realize altruistic behavior at the first level, they introduced a 
traditional OUT policy with a single proportional controller in the system 
feedback loop. This proportional controller enables us to manipulate the 
order placed by the retailer to achieve lower total supply chain cost. The 
sum of the standard deviations of net stock levels at each level was used 
as an objective function to be minimised. It is suggested that altruistic 
behavior by the first level player mitigates the bullwhip effect, and this 
lower bullwhip is the source of the benefit at the second level. Also, the 
cost benefit at the second level is large enough to compensate the loss at 
the first level. It is shown that on average more than 10% cost reduction 
can be achieved.  
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Some researchers assume that the second level player can modify the 
first level player’s order pattern by offering incentives and find that the first 
level player should be altruistic to achieve lower total costs. In his two-
level supply chain model, Gavirneni (2006) assumes that the supplier can 
alter the pattern of orders placed by the retailer, by offering fluctuating 
prices. As the result of this incentive, the retailer’s ordering pattern is not 
optimum for itself anymore and thus the retailer’s cost will increase. 
However, the benefit at the supplier is sufficient enough to compensate 
the increase at the retailer. The overall supply chain performance can be 
improved by 5% on average with the aid of information sharing. Luo 
(2007) considers a coordination scheme in a two-level supply chain 
consisting of a vendor and a buyer. The vendor asks the buyer to change 
its order quantity to achieve lower set up, ordering and inventory holding 
costs of the vendor. To convince the buyer, a credit period incentive is 
offered by the vendor. It is shown that the benefit to the vendor is always 
greater than the loss of the buyer so that this cooperation scheme can 
bring the benefits to overall supply chain. From these two papers, it might 
be reasonable to conclude that the type of incentives for the first level 
player affects the total amount of saving costs. Other incentives to 
encourage the first level player to incur cost increase include quantity 
flexibility (Tsay 1999), quantity discounts (Weng 1995), and revenue 
sharing (Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo 2004). 
 
The literature review suggests some useful insights to our problem. First, 
sharing market demand information may bring benefits to a supply chain, 
but the amount of such benefit is not clear. In our model, therefore, to 
negate the benefit coming from sharing the market demand information, it 
is assumed that up-to-date market demand information is shared and 
common knowledge in the supply chain. This assumption enables us to 
focus on the benefits only from the altruistic behavior. Secondly, it might 
be better to assume a centralized supply chain model to quantify the 
benefit of the altruistic behavior. In the case of a decentralized supply 
chain, incentives and/or a way of redistribution of the generated benefits 
may significantly affect the behavior of each player in a supply chain. The 
centralized supply chain assumption allows us to ignore such issues. 
Therefore, we will assume that in the supply chain there are no incentive 
conflicts, all necessary information is shared, and all players will 
cooperate to minimize the total cost.  
3 The model 
 
A serially linked three-level supply chain system is analyzed. All three 
players exploit a periodic review system, and the replenishment lead-time 
is constant and known. The ordering policy used herein is the OUT policy. 
The OUT level is adjusted each time period according to the latest 
updated demand forecast and the shared information. The knowledge 
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about the market demand process captured by the first level player is 
shared with all other players without delay. It is assumed that the true 
market demand process is correctly captured. The cost parameters and 
the ordering policies in the supply chain are common knowledge. 
3.1 Sequence of events and costs 
 
The sequence of events in any period at any level is as follows: the order 
placed earlier is received, and the demand is fulfilled at the beginning of 
the period, the net stock level is reviewed and ordering decision is made 
at the end of the period. We will now describe the three-level supply chain 
model where each level uses the OUT policy with the MMSE forecasting 
scheme. We assume a periodic review policy but do not assume a 
specific length of the review period. All of the results herein are consistent 
whatever review period is adopted (day, week, month, etc.). We will use 
the subscript n ( = 1, 2, 3) to represent the level of the supply chain. It is 
assumed that the costs in the supply chain are directly proportional to the 
standard deviation of the net stock level at each level as in Hosoda and 
Disney (2006a). Therefore, the objective function used in this research 
can be written as 
 
,][][][][ 3213 1 NSVNSVNSVNSVJ n n    (3.1) 
 
where ][ nNSV  represents the stable variance of the net stock level at n th 
level of the supply chain. 
3.2 Market demand 
 
Let us assume the demand pattern faced by the retailer is an AR(1) 
process. The AR(1) demand process assumption is common when 
autocorrelation exists among the demand process. Many researchers 
employ this assumption (see, Hosoda et al. 2008, for example). The 
formulation of AR(1) process is given by 
 
ttt DdD   1 , 
 
where tD  is the observed market demand at time period t, d is the 
constant term,   is the autoregressive coefficient, |  | < 1, and t  is an 
i.i.d. white noise process with a mean of zero and a variance of 2 . The 
stable variance of tD , ][ tDV , is )1/( 22   . Detailed discussions about an 
AR(1) model can be seen in Box et al. (1997). 
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3.3 Ordering policy 
 
The traditional OUT policy for the player at level n in the supply chain can 
be described as follows (Vassian 1955) 
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where ntO , is the order rate at time t,  tS  is the OUT level at time t and 
ntWIP ,  is the sum of orders that are already placed but not yet received at 
time t and can be expressed as   11 ,, .nLi nitnt OWIP  ntNS , is the end of 
period net stock level at time t, and nLntO 1,ˆ   is the conditional estimate of the 
total demand from the 1n  level player over nL  time periods, which is the 
lead-time plus review period. For n = 1, nLntO 1,ˆ   is denoted as 1ˆ LtD . To realize 
our generalized OUT policy, let us begin by modifying the traditional OUT 
policy. 
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where nLntO 1,~   is ]|[ 1,1,  ntnLt OOE n , the conditional estimate of the demand in 
time period nLt   made at t. Therefore, nnn LntLntLnt OOO 1,11,1, ˆˆ~   . When n = 1, 
nL
ntO 1,
~
 is ]|[ 1 tLt DDE   and denoted as .~ 1LtD  ntDIP , is a Desired Inventory 
Position at time t and ntDIP , = 11,ˆ nLntO = ]|[ 1,11 1,   ntLi nt OOE n . Note that ntDIP , = 0, 
if nL = 1. Incorporating a proportional controller, nF , into Eq. 3.2 yields the 
ordering policy, the generalized OUT policy. 
 
cksafety stoNSWIPDIPFOO ntntntn
L
ntnt
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where 0 < nF  < 2 as shown in Hosoda and Disney (2006a). Obviously, if 
nF  = 1, the policy is identical to the traditional OUT policy. In what follows, 
for simplicity, we will set d = 0 and stocksafety = 0 without loss of generality, 
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since these values are time invariant values and do not affect the value of 
J. 
 
4 Scenarios 
 
Three different scenarios will be considered herein. Scenario 1 is the 
three-level traditional OUT policy supply chain that was investigated in 
Hosoda and Disney (2006b). Scenario 1 will form the baseline scenario 
for the other scenarios to be compared against. Scenario 2 is the 
generalized OUT policy supply chain case where the first and the second  
level players exploit the generalized OUT policy and the third level player 
adopts the traditional OUT policy. Scenario 3 is a special case of Scenario 
 ; here not only the third level player, but also the first level player, 
adopts the traditional OUT policy to minimize its own variance of the net 
stock. Only the middle level player is concerned with minimizing the 
objective function by tuning its proportional controller, F2. Scenario 3 is 
expected to bring enough benefit so that this scenario might be a more 
acceptable strategy for a retail supply chain where usually the unit cost of 
the net stock at the first level (retail store, for example) is the most 
expensive. If Scenario 3 is successful, the variance of net stock level at 
the first level player, namely the retail store, is minimized due to the 
traditional OUT policy, and at the same time, the complete supply chain 
can also enjoy a cost reduction generated by the altruistic behavior of the 
second level player.  
4.1 Scenario 1: The traditional OUT policy supply chain 
 
In what follows ][ nNSV will be used to show the variance of net stock level 
in a traditional OUT policy supply chain. As shown in Hosoda and Disney 
(2006b), the expressions of the variances of net stock level at each level 
in a serially linked three-level supply chain model are expressed as; 
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Therefore the objective function for Scenario 1, JS1, becomes 
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4.2 Scenario 2: The generalized OUT policy supply chain 
 
Scenario 2 assumes that the generalized OUT policy is used in the three-
level supply chain. To minimize the objective function (Eq. 3.1), from the 
Principle of Optimality (Bellman 1957), the highest level player must use 
the policy which minimizes his own variance of the net stock level, as 
shown in Hosoda and Disney (2006a). Thus, the third level player should 
use the traditional OUT policy. As the result, only the first two players in 
the supply chain employ the generalized OUT policy. 
 
4.2.1 The ordering process and MMSE forecasts 
 
To obtain an MMSE forecast, knowledge of the structure of the order 
process is required. In the case of Scenario 2, the process of 1,tO  and 2,tO , 
the volume of orders placed by the first and the second players 
respectively, can be described as 
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Hosoda (2005) provides details. Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.3 yield expressions for 
the MMSE forecasts of ntO ,  over 1nL  time periods, 1,ˆ nLntO  where n = 1 and 2. 
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Hosoda (2005) provides details. Note that if a sequence of the traditional 
OUT policies are used in the supply chain (that is 121  FF ), then 21,ˆ LtO = 
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4.2.2 The objective function 
 
From here, the expression ][ nNSV  will be used for the variance of net 
stock levels of the generalized OUT policy at the n th level. As shown in 
the appendix and Hosoda (2005), the net stock levels at the first and the 
second levels follow ARMA(1, nL 1) processes, where n = 1 and 2 
respectively. By exploiting this property, we can have the following: 
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where   = 11 F ,   = 11 L . Detailed steps to obtain Eq. 4.4 and Eq. 
4.5 are shown in the appendix. Since the third level player adopts the 
traditional OUT policy to contribute to the minimization of the objective 
function, the forecast error over the lead-time plus review period can be 
used as an alternative. 
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Details of the derivation of Eq. 4.6 are shown in Hosoda (2005). It should 
be noted that Eq. 4.6 cannot be used when 11 F , 12 F , and/or when 
0  because of a singularity in the denominator. However, solutions do 
exist at the singularity, and they are also shown Hosoda (2005). In this 
section, Eq. 4.6 will be used in the analysis. 
 
The objective function for the three-level generalized supply chain model 
is 
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4.3 Scenario 3: The generalized OUT policy supply chain when 
11 F  
 
In Scenario 3, a special case of scenario 2, where 11 F , will be 
considered. In this scenario, only the second player employs the 
generalized OUT policy in the supply chain in order to manipulate the 
dynamics of the supply chain. 
 
In Scenario 3, from Eq. 4.3, the ordering process can be expressed as 
 
1
22
22,22,1 1
)1()1()1( 2121 


 
 t
LL
t
LL
tt
FFDFOFO 
 . 
 
From Eq. 4.5, by setting 11 F , the variance of the net stock level at the 
second in Scenario 3, ]1|[ 12 FNSV  can be expressed as 
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The variance of the net stock level at the third level in Scenario 3, 
]1|[ 13 FNSV , can be written as 
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Details are shown in Hosoda (2005).  By using Eq. 4.1, Eq. 4.8, and Eq. 
4.9, 3SJ , the objective function for Scenario 3 can be described as 
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Due to the rather unwieldy expressions of the objective functions, further 
analytical investigations are difficult to present. Thus, numerical 
investigations will be exploited. 
5 Numerical investigations 
 
In this section, the three scenarios with two lead-time settings 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 
3L  = 3 and 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3 will be investigated numerically. 2  = 1 is 
assumed. By using Eq. 4.7 and Eq. 4.10, the values of 2SJ  have been 
plotted in Fig. 5.1 and the values of 3SJ  in Fig. 5.2 - 5.3 with the restriction 
that 0 < 1F < 2 and 0 < 2F < 2, when  = -0.7, 0.0 and 0.7 for both lead-time 
settings. From these figures, it can be seen that 2SJ  and 3SJ  have an 
unique minimum value for the given values of  , 1L , 2L  and 3L . The 
optimum values of the proportional controllers, *1F , and *2F , to minimize 
the objective functions, 2SJ  and 3SJ  respectively, are obtained by using 
the cylindrical algebraic decomposition algorithm (Collins et al. 2002). *2SJ  
and *3SJ  will be used to represent the minimized values of 2SJ  and 3SJ , 
respectively. 
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5.1 Benefit of Scenario 2 
 
Tables 5.1 – 5.2 show the results of Scenario 1 and Tables 5.3 – 5.4 
highlight the results for Scenario 2.  From Tables 5.1 – 5.4, the following 
insights can be obtained. 
 1*2 SS JJ   for all values of   and all lead-time settings. This means 
that the generalized OUT policy supply chain always outperforms 
the traditional OUT policy supply chain. 
 Both *1F  and *2F  never have unit value. 
 The value of *nF  (n = 1, 2) is affected by both the value of   and 
the lead-time settings. 
 1*2 SS JJ   is achieved by altruistic behavior in the first level player, 
by accepting a greater level of net stock to achieve a 
predetermined customer service level. That is accepting 
][][ 11 NSVNSV  . 
 In almost all parameter settings, the second level player enjoys the 
benefit, that is ][][ 22 NSVNSV  . The only exception in the points 
of the solution space we have chosen is the case when 1L = 1, 2L = 
3, 3L = 3 and  = 0.9. 
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Figure 5.1: The values of 2SJ  
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Figure 5.2: The values of 3SJ  when 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 
 
 
  
Figure 5.3: The values of 3SJ  when 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3 
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Table 5.1: Values of 1SJ : 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 
 
  
 
Table 5.2: Values of 1SJ : 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3 
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Table 5.3: Values of *2SJ : 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 
 
  
 
Table 5.4: Values of *2SJ : 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3 
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Fig. 5.4 shows , 2SJ  a measure of the benefit of altruistic behavior, 
described as ( 1SJ *2SJ ) / 1SJ . The average values of the 2 SJ  are 26.1% 
and 22.7% for the lead-time settings 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 and 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 
3L = 3, respectively. If it is assumed that   is positive as in Lee et al. 
(2000), then the average values become as high as 26.9% and 23.7%, 
respectively. 
 
  
Figure 5.4: 2 SJ Objective function reduction (%) 
 
5.2 Benefit of Scenario 3 
 
Tables 5.5 – 5.6 provide the results of the numerical investigation. In 
Scenario 3, since the value of 1F  is constant ( 1F  = 1), only the optimum 
values of *2F  are shown in these tables. In this scenario, the first level 
player's standard deviation of the net stock level is identical to ][ 1NSV  
because of the unit value of 1F . 
 
From Tables 5.5 – 5.6, the following insights may be obtained. 
 1*3 SS JJ   for all values of   and lead-time settings. This means 
that the generalized OUT policy supply chain always outperforms 
the traditional OUT policy supply chain. 
 *2F  never has unit value. 
 The value of *2F  is affected by both the value of   and the lead-
time settings. 
 1*3 SS JJ   is achieved by altruistic behavior of the second level 
player. That is by accepting ][][ 22 NSVNSV  . 
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Table 5.5: Values of *3SJ : 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 
 
  
 
Table 5.6: Values of *3SJ : 1L = 1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3 
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By using a measure of benefit of 3 SJ = ( 1SJ *3SJ ) / 1SJ , the benefit of 
Scenario 3 has been plotted in Fig. 5.5. The average benefit in Scenario 3 
is 11.9% and 13.2% for the lead-time settings 1L = 2, 2L = 2, 3L = 3 and 1L = 
1, 2L = 3, 3L = 3, respectively. With the assumption of positive values of ,  
these average benefits will increase to 13.0% and 14.8%, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: 3 SJ Objective function reduction (%) 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
By using a three-level supply chain model, three different scenarios have 
been investigated and some interesting insights have been obtained. To 
obtain analytical expressions of the variances of the end-period net stock 
levels at each level in the generalized OUT policy supply chain, a newly 
developed method is exploited. The traditional OUT policy supply chain 
has been used as a benchmark for performance in Scenario 1.  
 
In Scenario 2, two proportional controllers were incorporated, one at the 
first level, and the other at the second level. By adjusting the values of the 
proportional controllers properly, a significant amount of benefit can be 
obtained. Neither of these two controllers takes unit values; however, 
][ 2NSV  is less than ][ 2NSV , and only altruistic behavior of the first level is 
required to enjoy such a benefit, in almost all parameter settings. The 
quantified benefits are quite large, and it is shown that such benefits come 
from each player in the supply chain doing what is the best for itself and 
the supply chain, rather than doing what is the best for its own selfish 
interests. In other words, a sequence of optimum policies does not 
provide a global minimum cost of a supply chain.  
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Scenario 2 has shown the lowest cost function in the model settings; 
however, to enjoy the benefit, the altruistic behavior at the first level must 
be accepted. But this is usually where the most expensive inventory 
holding costs are incurred. In addition, the redistribution of the inventory 
costs among players might be a barrier to implementation of Scenario 2, 
as we discussed in Literature review. Some additional incentives for the 
first level player may be necessary, since the overall benefit completely 
depends on the degree of altruistic behavior given by the first level player. 
 
To overcome incentive conflict issues in a supply chain, Scenario 3 is 
considered. Scenario 3 may be a case of a three-level supply chain that is 
governed by two organizations: the first level inventory is managed by a 
retailer, and both second and third level inventories are managed by a 
supplier, for example. The retailer's concern is to minimize its own 
inventory related costs. The supplier's interest is to minimize the sum of 
the inventory related cost at both second and third levels. The retailer can 
help the supplier by providing up-to-date market demand information. To 
achieve the goal independently, the retailer may use the traditional OUT 
policy, which minimizes its own standard deviation of net stock level, and 
the supplier incorporates 2F  into the OUT policy at the second level and 
employs the traditional OUT policy at the third level to minimize its total 
inventory related costs. Having worked in the real business world, the two 
organization three-level supply chain in Scenario 3 might become realistic. 
Since the supplier behaves altruistically and it is the supplier who enjoys 
the benefit from Scenario 3, it may be more acceptable to a real business 
world than Scenario 2. Therefore, Scenario 3 could bring a “win-win” 
situation in a supply chain easily with less difficulty in implementation and 
operation.  
 
There might be some challenges to enjoy the benefit. The results shown 
herein depend on a crucial assumption that all necessary information is 
shared without delay and exploited in a proper manner to obtain optimum 
values of Fn. To share the information without delay, the use of 
information technologies such as Internet and/or EDI might be essential. 
For the latter point, since the value of the objective function is not so 
sensitive to the value of Fn (see, Figure 5.1 – 5.3, for example), even if the 
values of proportional controllers actually used in a supply chain are 
slightly different from the optimum values, the supply chain still can 
reduce its total costs by exploiting the generalized OUT policy. 
 
Appendix 
 
To optimize supply chain costs, analytical expressions of a cost function 
are essential. In this research, analytical expressions of variances are 
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exploited. These expressions are able to be obtained through the 
following steps (Hosoda 2005). 
 
Step 1: Express the end-period net stock level process as an 
ARMA(1,q) process, where q is a non-negative integer. 
 
Step 2: Obtain the analytical expression of the variance of the 
ARMA(1,q) process. 
 
The most significant advantage of this method is that it is not necessary to 
specify the value of the lead-times in a supply chain to gain analytical 
expressions. 
 
From now, the details about how to obtain ][ 1NSV  will be shown. By 
following the same steps, ][ 2NSV  is also obtainable.  
 
In our model, the order placed by the first level player is expressed as 
 
))((~ 1,1,1,11, 1 tttLtt NSWIPDIPFDO  . (A.1) 
 
It is assumed herein that 1,tNS can be described as  
 
tLttt DONSNS   1,1,11, 1 . 
 
From above equation, 
 
111 1,11,1, LtLtLtt DNSNSO   , (A.2) 
 
can be obtained. 1,tWIP  can be expressed as 
 
.11 1,1, 1  Li itt OWIP  (A.3) 
 
Consider first the case when 1L  is greater than one. Substituting Eq. A.2 
into Eq. A.3, another expression of 1,tWIP  is 
 
    111,1,11, 11 Li ittLtt DNSNSWIP . (A.4) 
 
After incorporating Eq. A.2 and Eq. A.4 into the LHS and the RHS of Eq. 
A.1, respectively, some algebraic simplification yields 
 
)()~()1( 11 11,11111,11,1 1 111 1    Li iLtLttL Lttt DDIPFDDNSFNS . (A.5) 
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Now, 1tD  can be expressed by using 11 LtD  , 
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Thus, since 1 11
~ L
LtD  = ]|[ 111 Ltt DDE  , 1 11
~ L
LtD   is given by  
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Therefore, 111 1~   tL Lt DD  can be written as 
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  11 11 1Li iLtD can be described as 
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And 1,1 1LtDIP   is 
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Thus, an expression for )( 11 11,11 1 11     Li iLtLt DDIPF  becomes 
           20 20 2111 11,11 1 1 11 11 )(Li iLj iLtjLi iLtLt FDDIPF  . (A.7) 
 
By substituting Eq. A.6 and Eq. A.7 into Eq. A.5, the final expression of 
the end-period net stock level process at the first level can be expressed 
as 
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where 1  = 11 F  and 1
)1(1
1, 
 

i
i
i
F . 
 
From Eq. A.8, it can be seen that 1,tNS  follows ARMA(1, 1L 1) process 
with AutoreRressive (AR) coefficient 1  and Moving Average (MA) 
coefficients 1,0  ,, 1,11L . It should be noted that in the case of the 
traditional OUT policy where 1F  = 1, the AR coefficient 1  becomes zero 
and 1,tNS  follows ARMA(0, 1L 1) process. This result coincides with 
Gilbert (2005). Generally, the variance of ARMA(1,q) process at level n 
can be expressed as 
 
        qi qi ij njjinninnin 0 1 10 , 1, 2, 2
2
)(21 
 . (A.9) 
 
After substituting the AR and the MA coefficients into Eq. A.9, some 
algebraic simplification yields Eq. 4.4. The same conclusions can be 
obtained for the case of 1L  = 1, where 1,tWIP = 0, by following the same 
steps described herein. 
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